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QUALITYAS INDICATED BY
MARKET YIELD RELATIONSHIPS
The money and capital markets' evaluation of instrument and borrower char-
acteristics and of the external environment is another method that can be
used to measure the quality of state and local debt. Relationships between
market yields on various debt instruments are used to assess the money and
capital markets' evaluation. This method of measuring the quality of state
and local debt is very difficult to interpret because of the large number of
factors, in addition to credit quality, that affect market yield relationships.
In this chapter, the use of market yield relationships as a measure of credit
quality is briefly examined. Two categories of yield relationships are analyz-
ed: (1) the relationships between yield indexes of federal government debt
and state and local debt and (2) the relationships among the yields on differ-
ent rating classes and different other classifications of state and local debt.
The Use of Market Yield Relationships as a Measure of Credit Quality
There are numerous explanations of the determinants of relative prices and,
therefore, relative market yields among debt instruments.1 In order to avoid a
lengthy discussion of these explanations, which seems inappropriate for this
paper, the author has divided what he believes are the primary determinants
of market yield relationships among debt instruments into three broad group-
ings: supply factors, institutional factors and factors affecting the preferences
of investors and potential investors among debt instruments. Factors affecting
'Several National Bureau publications (such as The Cyclical Behavior of the Term
Structure of Interest Rates by Reuben A. Kessel and The Behavior of Interest Rates by
Joseph W. Conard) as well as numerous other books andjournalarticles are devoted to
various explanations of the determinants of market yield relationships.126 Postwar Quality of State and Local Debt
propensities to save and consume and the choice between debt and equity
type instruments are not treated as direct determinants of market yield rela-
tionships among debt instruments in this study.
The supply factors include the supply outstanding, the supply recently
issued and the expected future supply among various types of debt instru-
ments. In the author's opinion, these supply factors, tend to affect market
yields because the various types of debt instruments compete as imperfect
substitutes for investible funds at any point of time.2 Figures on the amounts
of various debt instruments outstanding and newly issued and short period
predictions for coming debt issues are generally available.
Institutional factors often limit the investors' choice among debt instru-
ments. Institutional practices and regulatory constraints tend to influence
particular markets and limit arbitrage among markets, therefore, the market
for debt instruments has a degree of segmentation rather than perfect homo-
geneity. Particular attention should be paid to changes in institutional prac-
tices and regulatory constraints since they may have an appreciable effect on
market yields.
The debt investment preferences of owners of investible dollars also affect
the market yields of debt instruments. The principal factors that seem to
affect the preferences of investors and potential investors among debt instru-
ments (i.e., the price they are willing to pay) are: (1) special terms in the debt
contract, such as callability or convertibility; (2) the taxability of the return
of the debt instrument; (3) the time of repayment; (4) the marketability of
the debt instrument; and (5)thequality of the debt instrument.
Most of the effects of special terms and taxability can be removed as
factors affecting the market yield by observing groups of debt instruments
that are fairly homogenous in those areas. Where comparisons are made be-
tween the market yields on federal government securities (whose interest is
now fully subject to income taxes) and the market yields on state and local
indebtedness (whose interest is exempt from both personal and corporate
income taxes at the present time), the observations are generally for short
periods of time and major changes in both the personal and corporate income
tax rate structures are separately taken into account.
The third factor affecting investment preferences, the time of repayment,
can be caused by differences in maturity dates or in the way repayment is
distributed over time. Two market characteristics, the increased doubt about
the quality of an issue as the maturity lengthens and the lower interest rate
risk as the maturity becomes shorter, explain much of the disparity between
market yields due to this factor. For short-term issues with quality character-
2Some economists reject the notion that relative supplies of debt instruments materi-
ally affect their prices. In previous work the author has found high simple correlation
coefficients between the relative supplies of state and local debt and federal government
debt and the market yield differentials between these two types of debt instruments.Market Yield Relationships 127
istics similar to those on long-term contracts, the lender generally feels more
assured about the repayment of his debt instrument and believes its price will
be more stable. Lenders with liquidity requirements are willing to pay a
premium for these advantages unless there are unusual interest rate expecta-
tions or an unusual supply-demand situation for liquidity. In this study, most
of the variations among market yields due to maturity or repayment differ-
ences are removed by considering only securities within given maturity and
repayment groupings.3
Differences in the degree of marketability also affect the yield differential
between debt instruments. Marketability is defined as the ability to sell a debt
instrument within a very short time without obliging either the seller or buyer
to make an appreciable concession from the price at which the debt instru-
ment was last sold. Some investors, realizing that they may want or may be
forced to buy or sell their debt instruments quickly, prefer a highly market-
able issue and are willing to pay more, i.e., accept a lower yield, for this
characteristic. Because of this added demand, market yields on debt instru-
ments tend to be lower with increasing degrees of marketability.
Accurate information on measures that might indicate marketability, as
the number of issues traded in a given time period or the spread between bid
and asked prices, is generally not available at the present time. The size of the
issue may be another indicator of the marketability of state and local debt.
However, two studies by the Investment Bankers Association indicated that
within homogenous rating groups there was no tendency for larger municipal
issues to have a net interest cost advantage over smaller municipal issues.
These studies suggest that, where the quality of the state and local issue is
similar, small units do not suffer any significant disadvantage by selling their
bonds in competition with large units.4 Therefore, while the effects of mar-
ketability have not been removed, these effects seem relatively minor with
the possible exception of some very small issues.
Differences in the quality of debt instruments are reflected in the market
yields of debt instruments because lenders are willing to pay a higher price for
a debt contract of a high quality borrower than for a similar contract of a
lower quality borrower. Two interrelated reasons explain this preference.
First, a more trustworthy borrower gives more complete assurance that the
promised principal and interest will be paid. As the credit trustworthiness of
the borrower declines, the lender becomes less certain the promised sums will
be paid. Second, the maximum amount all borrowers, regardless of credit
3lhere are several other theories explaining the term structure of interest rates. The
important point is that, no matter which theory is correct, the effects of the time of
repayment are removed by comparing securities within given maturity and repayment
groupings.
41.B.A. Statistical Bulletins Nos. 3 and 5, Investment Bankers Association, Washing-
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rating, will pay is the promised principal and interest. Thus, the promised
sums are the most the lender can expect; all the possible variations from the
promised sums are negative ones. The second reason clearly indicates that the
mean values of the probable outcomes for the borrower with weaker credit
are less than those for the sound borrower. Combined, these two reasons may
be expected to induce the lender to lend to the less sound borrower only if he
is offered better terms. The premium the lender demands from the weaker
borrower should be determined by the prospective risk of default so that the
amounts finally realized from large groups of debt instruments at several
levels of quality should be approximately the same.
After adjusting for the effects of the discussed factors other than quality,
market yield relationships have still been an imprecise measure of quality. For
example, Hickman's study on the quality of corporate bonds from 1900 to
1943 pointed out that, after all defaults and redemptions were considered,
the group of bonds with the lowest promised yield to maturity had a realized
yield of 5.1 per cent and the group of bonds with the highest promised yield
to maturity had a realized yield of 8.6 per cent.5 Assuming similar terms, and
assuming that the maturity dates and repayment schedules are comparable,
the results following the earlier explanation should have been similar realized
yields, i.e., the different promised yields should have been about equalized by
the incidence of defaults.
Such differences in the results probably are primarily caused by the ef-
fects of market imperfections and uncertainty on market yield relationships.
The competition among investors for debt instruments is far from perfect.
For example, investors are often limited by regulations and a lack of knowl-
edge or resources. Such limitations may distort the demand for some types of
quality levels of debt instruments. Furthermore, while uncertainty, which
takes the character of subjective probability distributions, exists in all debt
instruments having any degree of credit risk, such uncertainty is usually high-
est for bonds with the highest promised yields. This uncertainty is indicated
by the greater dispersion of the probable outcomes for borrowers with weak-
er credit. The premium for accepting such uncertainty may well account for a
substantial part of the differences between realized yields.
Despite market imperfections and uncertainty, market yield relationships
on state and local debt still appear to be a measure of credit quality that
should be exan)ined. Market yield relationships have been useful indicators of
the credit ranking of many debt instruments despite their admitted weak-
nesses in quantifying the exact credit differences. For example, in the Hick-
man study the default rate was 5.9 per cent for corporate bonds with the
lowest promised yield and continued, in sequential order, up to a default rate
5W. Braddock Hickman, Corporate Bonds: Quality and Investment Performance,
Occasional Paper 59, New York, NBER, 1957. Hickman's study is the only available
study of the long-run realized yield in any sector of the capital market.-w
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of 42.4 per cent for corporate bonds with the highest promised yield.6 Mar-
ket yield relationships have been more effective as a measure of credit quality
within one type or sector of debt instruments than among types or sectors.
Yield differentials are used in this study as an estimate of the money and
capital markets' evaluation of the quality of state and local debt. Changes in
yield differentials are traced to quality changes only after the potential ef-
fects of other explanatory factors are examined. It should be noted that
quality may play a role even when other factors dominate. Two categories of
yield differentials are examined. First, the relationships between the yields on
state and local debt and federal government debt with similar maturities are
used to indicate the absolute quality of state and local debt. Changes in the
differential between these yields should represent meaningful changes in the
yields on state and local debt, rather than changes in the level of all market
yields. The yields on federal securities are used as the market yardstick since
they are as free from credit risk as possible. An appreciable change in the
differential between the yields on state and local debt and the yields on
federal government debt should, ceteris paribus, indicate a change in the
quality of state and local debt.
The relationships among the yields on state and local debt both in differ-
ent rating classes and in different classifications are also studied. The yield
differentials should indicate the money and capital markets' evaluation of
quality and changes in quality among the various rating categories and classifi-
cations of state and local debt. They should also help indicate sectors of
classifications where quality is or may become a problem.
Quality as Measured by Yield Relationships with Federal Government Bonds
The comparison of the long-term yields on state and local issues and federal
government bonds should, ceteris paribus, indicate the money and capital
markets' evaluation of the quality of state and local debt.7 Since other things
are seldom equal, the effects of major exogenous factors must be included in
the analysis. For example, pronounced shifts in the annual rate of change of
marketable federal debt outstanding, or in the annual rate of change of mar-
ketable state and local debt outstanding, may cause deviations from the usual
relationship between yields on the two types of bonds. Changes in tax rates
and the level of taxable income may also distort direct comparisons between
the yield differential at various points of time.
6jbjd
kong-termyield index relationships should be the most meaningful measure of yield
in state and local debt because most state and local debt outstanding is long-term and
because the relative term structure of state and local debt has remained fairly constant.130 Postwar Quality of State and Local Debt
The average quarterly yields on Moody's index of long-term, partially
taxable federal bonds8 and on the Bond Buyer's index of twenty tax exempt
long-term general obligation bonds from 1921 through 1943 are presented in
Chart 21. The Bond Buyer's index is the only current yield index that was
available in the 1920's and early 1930's. The yield differential is found by
subtracting the yield on state and local bonds from that on federal bonds at
the same point of time. This yield differential appears in the lower section of
Chart 21. When the effects of factors affecting market yields other than
quality are removed or isolated, movement toward a larger negative yield
differential should indicate the money and capital markets believed the quali-
ty of state and local debt deteriorated, while movement toward a positive
yield differential should indicate the money and capital markets believed the
quality of state and local debt improved. To obtain a more meaningful analy-
sis, the lengthy period covered in Chart 21 is broken into four subperiods of
shorter duration.
The movement toward a larger negative yield differential between partially
taxable federal bonds and tax exempt state and local bonds in the subperiod
from 1921 through 1925 indicates that the money and capital markets would
not pay as much, i.e., demanded a higher yield premium, for state and local
bonds relative to federal bonds. The primary factor leading to this movement
was probably the pronounced decline in personal income taxes —themaxi-
mum tax rate fell from 58 to 25 per cent in this subperiod. Supply factors,
such as the decline in the amount of marketable federal debt outstanding,
also probably contributed to the widening of the negative yield differential
during this period. Changes in the money and capital markets' evaluation of
the quality of state and local indebtedness seem difficult to meaningfully
isolate because of these other factors which also lead to an increase in the
negative yield differential.
The negative yield differential between state and local bonds and partially
taxable federal bonds became slightly wider during most of the second sub-
period, 1926-31. During these years, the supply of marketable federal debt
decreased at approximately a S per cent compounded rate, while the supply
of state and local debt increased at approximately a 6 per cent compounded
rate. These changes tend to have a widening influence on the negative yield
differential. Personal and corporate income tax rates were constant during
most of this subperiod; however, the short-term narrowing in the negative
yield differential in late 1931 appears to be due to a large increase in personal
income tax rates at that time. The maximum personal income tax rate went
from 25 per cent in 1931 to 63 per cent in 1932. Once again the market
yields were not sufficiently free of the affects of other factors to isolate the
8A11 of the interest on these bonds was exempt from the normal income tax, but only
the interest on the first $5 ,000 of principal was exempt from the surtax. Most of the
federal government bonds issued prior to March 1, 1941, were taxed in this manner.Market Yield Relationships 131
Sources: Moody's Municipal and Government Manual and The Weekly Bond Buyer.
CHART 21
Yield Relationship between U.S. Government Bonds and State
and Local Bonds, Quarterly Yields, 1921-43132 Postwar Quality of State and Local Debt
money and capital markets' evaluation of changes in the quality of state and
local debt.
In the third subperiod, 1932-34, the negative yield differential between
federal bonds and state and local bonds widened substantially. The primary
cause for this increase in the differential was clearly that the money and
capital markets believed the quality of state and local debt had deteriorated.
This deterioration is substantiated by the very large relative increase in the
negative yield differential, in spite of other factors such as higher personal
income tax rates and an increase in the amount of marketable federal debt
outstanding while state and local debt outstanding remained fairly constant,
which should have had a narrowing influence. By early 1935 the yield dif-
ferential had returned to the 1931 level.
From 1935 through 1943, the last subperiod covered in Chart 21, the
negative yield differential gradually became smaller and was positive in 1943.
The factors contributing to this gradual narrowing include: an appreciable
increase in the amount of marketable federal debt outstanding, a constant
amount of marketable state and local debt outstanding, a steady increase in
corporate income tax rates (from 13.75 per cent maximum to 40 per cent
maximum in this subperiod), and an increase in personal income tax rates.
Because of the effects of these factors, it seems unreasonable to make a
conclusion about the changes, if any, in the money and capital markets'
evaluation of quality for this subperiod.
In summary, the yield differential between long-term yields on state and
local indebtedness and on federal bonds indicated significant positive or nega-
tive shifts in the quality of state and local debt in only one of the four
subperiods covered in Chart 21, 1932-34. Changes in the yield differential
between state and local bonds and government bonds in the other years
covered by Chart 21 were not sufficiently free of changes in supply factors or
changes in income tax rates to allow a definitive conclusion about quality. It
is noticeable that both the decline and subsequent improvement in the money
and capital markets' evaluation of the quality of state and local debt lagged
behind the increase and decrease in defaults in the early 1930's.
Chart 22 is a continuation of Chart 21 from 1942 through 1968 except
for one major change. The quarterly average yield on Moody's index of
long-term, taxable federal bonds is compared with the quarterly average yield
on long-term state and local issues because the interest on all federal bonds
issued after 1941 was fully taxable. Because of the different yield index used
for the federal bonds, they typically sold at higher yields than the tax-exempt
state and local bonds. This change means that, ceteris paribus, significant
narrowing of the positive yield differential (movement toward a negative
differential) should indicate a decline in the money and capital markets'
evaluation of state and local debt, while significant movement toward a larger
positive yield differential should indicate an improved market evaluation.
In the period from 1942 through 1945 both personal and corporate in-Market Yield Relationships 133
CHART22
Yield Relationship between U.S. Government Bonds and State
and Local Bonds, Quarterly Yields, 1942-68
come tax rates rose, the amount of marketable U. S. government debt out-
standing increased approximately fourfold and the amount of marketable
state and local debt outstanding declined at a rate of approximately 5 per
cent a year. These exogenous factors probably explain most of the increase in
the positive yield differential during this period. The exact opposite of these
factors —adecline in personal income tax rates, a decline in the amount of
marketable federal debt oustanding and large increases in the amount of
marketable state and local debt outstanding —probablyexplain most of the
decrease in the yield differential in the four years following World War II.
Sources: Moody's Municipal and Government Manual and The Weekly Bond Buyer.134 Postwar Quality of State and Local Debt
Because of the marked changes in the above factors, no definitive conclusions
can be made from market yields about changes in the money and capital
markets' evaluation of the quality of state and local debt during World War II
and in the years immediately following it.
Analysis of the period from 1949 through 1960 is simplified because
personal and corporate income tax rates were fairly stable (there were small
adjustments in 1951 and 1954) and the supply of marketable outstanding
state and local debt increased at a relatively constant rate each year. In this
period the shifts in the yield differential were relatively small and followed a
definite cyclical pattern. The yield differential tended to widen in periods of
prosperity and narrow during recessionary periods. Part of the explanation
for this cyclical pattern may be that the money and capital markets believed
there was a slight deterioration in the quality of state and local debt during
recessionary periods and a slight improvement in its quality during boom
periods. Much of the shifts in. the yield differential from 1949 to 1961,
however, seems to be explained by changes in the supply of marketable
federal debt.9
The wider positive yield differential between federal bonds and state and
local bonds from 1961 through 1965 calls for special attention. During sever-
al earlier periods covered in Chart 22 this yield differential had widened as
much or more than it did from 1961 through 1965. During these earlier
periods one or more of the other factors affecting market yields appear to
have explained much of the widening in the positive yield differential. From
1961 through 1965, the supply of outstanding marketable federal debt grew
slowly and at a constant rate; the supply of outstanding marketable state and
local debt grew rapidly at a rate similar to its growth throughout the 1950's;
and corporate and personal income tax rates were reduced slightly. These
factors should tend to exert a narrowing influence on the positive yield
differential between the two types of bonds. However, this narrowing in-
fluence was moderated by a change in institutional conditions —commercial
banks were allowed to pay higher rates to attract certificates of deposits —
thatexerted a widening influence on the positive yield differential between
federal bonds and state and local bonds in the 196 1-65 period. Examined in
the light of these changes in other factors the market yields in Chart 22 seem
to indicate that the money and capital markets believed the quality of state
and local debt remained constant or improved slightly from 1961 thr6ugh 1965.
The yield differential was subject to conflicting influences —rapidgrowth
in outstanding marketable federal debt, a 10 per cent surcharge on corporate
and personal income taxes in 1968, and an even higher maximum rate on
9The Investment Bankers Association concluded that the rate of change in outstand-
ing marketable U. S. government debt accounted for about half of the deviation from
the normal yield relationship from 1954 through 1960. (I.B.A. Statistical Bulletin, No-
vember 1960, pp. 1-3).Market Yield Relationships 135
commercial bank certificates of deposits —againfrom 1966 through 1968.
Yield differentials changed little from their 1965 levels throughout the
1966-68 period, which may indicate that the money and capital markets
believed the quality of state and local debt remained relatively stable.
Conclusions based on the relationship between the yields on long-term
federal bonds and those on the Bond Buyer's index of twenty long-term state
and local bonds might overlook changes in the quality of state and local
bonds not covered by this index. The Bond Buyer's index is based upon three
Aaa general obligations, eight Aa general obligations, eight A general obliga-
tions and one Baa general obligation. Conclusions about changes in quality
from Chart 22, therefore, are based primarily on the yield relationships be-
tween federal bonds and Aaa and A general obligations. Large changes in the
quality of Aaa or Baa general obligations or other types of state and local
debt might be indicated by the yield relationships between these rating classes
or types of state and local debt, and federal bonds, and not be observable in
Chart 22.
Chart 23 depicts the yield differentials between the quarterly yields on
Moody's index of long-term, taxable federal bonds and Moody's quarterly
average yields for long-term Aaa and Baa general obligation bonds from 1942
through 1968. Since the two state and local yield averages are subtracted
from the yield on federal bonds at the same point of time a significant
positive increase in either or both of these yield differentials should, ceteris
paribus, indicate an improvement in the quality of that rating class of general
obligations. Similarly, a significant decrease in the positive yield differential
should, ceteris paribus, indicate that the money and capital markets believed
there was a deterioration in the quality of that rating class.
Analysis of Chart 23 indicates that both yield differentials had an upward
trend from 1942 through 1945, a downward trend from 1945 through 1949,
then followed a cyclical pattern from 1949 through 1960. The difference
between the two yield differentials ranged from 70 to 120 basis points from
1942 through 1960. Thus, the yield differentials between federal bonds and
both Aaa and Baa general obligations followed a pattern similar to the dif-
ferential between the yields on federal bonds and those on the Bond Buyer's
index of twenty state and local bonds from 1942 through 1960.
The 1960's are a different story. Yields on federal bonds exceeded yields
on Baa general obligations in the early 1960's and exceeded these yields by
roughly 50 basis points in the mid-1960's. During the same period yields on
bonds did not rise over 100 basis points (as they did in the two earlier periods
that federal yields exceeded Baa general obligation yields) above Aaa general
obligations until the mid-1960's.
The money and capital markets appear to believe that the quality of Aaa
general obligations remained fairly constant in the 1960's. This conclusion
seems appropriate from 1961 through 1965 because the low rate of increase
in the supply of outstanding federal debt and the small income tax reductions136 Postwar Quality of State and Local Debt
CHART21
Yield Differentials between U.S. Government Bonds and Aaa
and Baa General Obligations, Quarterly Yields, 1942-68
Baa general obligations minus general obligations
U. S. Government bonds minus Aaa general obligolions
U. S. Government bonds minus Baa general obligations
Yield differential (basis points)
Source: Moody's Municipal and Government Manual.
in1963 and 1964 probably slowed the widening of the yield differential. The
moderate increase in this yield differential in the 1966-68 period seems ex-
plained more by the switch to rapid growth in marketable federal debt out-
standing than by a change in the money and capital markets' evaluation of
quality.
In the case of Baa general obligations, however, the money and capital
markets seem to believe that the quality of debt in this rating category
improved slightly in the early 1960's. Some of the widening in the positive
yield differential was probably because commercial banks reached for higher
yields in order to be able to attract certificates of deposits. On the other
hand, the low rate of increase in federal debt and the income tax reduction in
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1963 and 1964 should have had a narrowing influence. By the mid-1960's the
widening slowed and the quality of Baa general obligations as indicated by
market yields appeared to be relatively constant.
Quality as Measured by Yield Relationships between Different
Rating Categories and Different Types of State and Local Debt
Shifts in the relationship between the yields on federal bonds and the yields
on an index of rated state and local general obligations with similar maturities
provide only one way of measuring changes in the money and capital mar-
kets' evaluation of the quality of state and local debt. It seems equally imp or-
tant to study the level and any shifts in the relationships between the yields
on state and local issues in different rating categories and between the yields
on different types of state and local isssues. Such an analysis takes into
account many issues not covered in the indexes of general obligations used so
far and should indicate any appreciable changes in th.e money and capital
markets' evaluation of the relative quality among various rating classes and
types of such indebtedness. These yield comparisons should indicate the mar-
ginal classes of state and local debt, where the money and capital markets
believe that the quality of the debt is materially different or has changed
markedly from the quality indicated by the indexes used in the preceding
section.10 Since the analysiscompares tax-exempt state and local yields, tax
factors have little or no effect and changes in institutional conditions should
have less of an impact.
Several types of yield relationships are examined. First, an analysis is made
of the yield relationships among the various rating categories of general obli-
gations. These relationships should help compare the evaluations of the mon-
ey and capital markets as indicated by market yields with the evaluations of
the rating agencies. The yields on unrated general obligations are then com-
pared with the yields on rated general obligations. Since 49.5 per cent of the
general obligations issued from 1957through1968 were not rated.'' Some
conception of the quality of unrated general obligations is necessary before
reaching any over-all conclusions on the money and capital markets' evalua-
tion of the quality of state and local debt.
conclusions can still be made on the absolute quality of the different rating
classes and types of state and local debt because the quality of Aaa general obligations
was evaluated as being relatively constant in the postwar period and because the monthly
yields on Aaa general obligations were highly correlated with the monthly yields on
federal bonds for the mid-1956 through 1968 period.
11This proportion is based on the number of issues rated and unrated from the LB.A.
Statistical Bulletins.Figuresfrom the same source show that these unrated bonds were
11.2 per cent of the total dollar amount of general obligations issued from 1957 through
1968.138 Postwar Quality of State and Local Debt
The yields on rated and unrated state and local limited liability obligations
are then compared with the yields on general obligations. This comparison
should indicate areas where the money and capital markets feel the quality of
limited liability obligations is substantially different, or has deteriorated or
improved. In addition, the yield relationships between general obligations and
rated limited liability obligations may give an impression of the comparability
of the ratings given general obligations with the ratings assigned to limited
liability obligations. Appendix Table 2 shows that limited liability obligations
were nearly 40 per cent of the total amount of state and local debt outstand-
ing in 1968, so a careful study of the money and capital markets' evaluation
of the quality of limited liability obligations is very important to any over-all
conclusions about the quality of such debt. Finally, the yields on special
types of state and local debt, such as industrial aid bonds and toll road issues,
are compared with the yields on rated obligations in order to isolate any
special type or types of debt where the money and capital markets believe
credit quality is materially different or has changed markedly.
The Yield Relationship Among
General Obligation Rating Categories
The yield differential between the long-term yields on Moody's indexes of
Aaa general obligations and Baa general obligations was included in Chart 23
(page 136). These two indexes were chosen because they represent, respective-
ly, the best and worst quality of rated general obligations for which yield
computations are available. Narrowing of this yield differential should indi-
cate an improvement in the quality of Baa general obligations relative to the
quality of Aaa general obligations. Widening of this yield differential should
indicate the converse.
Chart 23 shows that from the early 1940's through 1960 the yield differ-
ential between Baa and Aaa general obligations fluctuated in a narrow range
from 70 to 120 points. There was no marked trend in the fluctuations within
this range; however, the yield differential tended to widen slightly during
recessionary periods and to narrow somewhat during boom periods. In this
decade and a half of relatively mild economic fluctuations, the yields on Baa
general obligations did not follow the countercycical interest rate policies as
closely as the yields on Aaa general obligations. The assumption is that in
recessionary periods, when interest rates tend to be relatively low, a slight
deterioration in the quality of Baa general obligations kept the yields on these
obligations from falling as much as the yields on Aaa general obligations
whose quality remained about the same. The opposite effect occurred in
prosperous periods when interest rates were high. These offsetting effects of
the slight changes in bond quality and countercyclical interest rate policies
mean that during periods of mild economic fluctuations the prices of the
lower rated Baa general obligations tend to fluctuate less than the prices ofMarket Yield Relationships 139
higher rated Aaa general obligations. Despite these small changes in the quali-
ty of Baa general obligations, the yield relationship between Baa and Aaa
general obligations indicated the capital markets felt there was little in the
way of substantial quality changes between these two rating categories from
the early 1940's through 1960.
The only substantial postwar change in the money and capital markets'
evaluation of the quality of Baa general obligations relative to Aaa general
obligations, indicated by the market yields in Chart 23, began in 1961 when
the yield differential broke through the postwar lower range limit of 70 basis
points. From 1961 through 1965 the yield differential narrowed considerably
indicating an improvement in the money and capital markets' evaluation of
Baa relative to Aaa general obligations.12 The narrowing trend in the yield
differential appeared to end in 1966.
The improvement in the markets' evaluation of the quality of other rating
categories of general obligations relative to Aaa general obligations is not
limited to Baa general obligations. The yearly averages of the monthly differ-
entials between the market yields of Aaa general obligations and those of Aa,
A and Baa general obligations were:
Aa minus Aaa A minus Aaa Baa minus Aaa
1957 22 65 105
1958 22 59 92
1959 14 50 81
1960 16 51 82
1961 14 34 61
1962 11 25 52
1963 8 20 43
1964 7 19 42
1965 7 19 40
1966 9 25 49
1967 10 26 55
1968 10 31 6313
Comparison of the decreases in these yield differentials shows that the
yield differentials between Aaa general obligations and Aa and A general
obligations have declined by at least as great a relative amount as the yield
differential between Aaa and Baa general obligations. This decline in the yield
differential seems to mean that the money and capital markets believed the
12As discussed earlier, the narrowing yield differential is also partly explained by
commercial banks demanding more higher yielding state and local bonds to remain
profitably competitive with higher maximum rates.
on monthly new issue reoffering yields prepared by the Investment Bankers
Association.140 Postwar Quality of State and Local Debt
quality of both Aa and A general obligations also has improved slightly rela-
tive to the quality of Aaa general obligations from 1961 through 1965.14
Quality of Unrated Long-Term General Obligations
Up to this point the information on the quality of state and local debt as
indicated by market yield differentials has only taken into account the quali-
ty of rated long-term general obligations. In attempting to evaluate the over-
all quality of state and local debt this is a limited and biased sample.
Only 31,917 of the 76,277 state and local bonds recorded as issued from
1957 through 1968 were rated general obligations. Thus, rated general obliga-
tions comprised only 41.8 per cent of all state and local bonds recorded as
issued over this eleven year period. The dollar amount of long-term state and
local debt recorded as issued from 1957 through 1968 was $1 19,638 million.
Of this total, $70,066 million or 58.6 per cent was rated long-term general
obligations.15
The market yields of rated general obligation bonds would be a valid
sample for the population of all state and local debt if the market yields of
these general obligations were representative of the market yields on all state
and local debt. This supposition can be challenged even before observing the
yield data. For example, bond analysts typically feel many state and local
limited liability obligations should, ceteris paribus, command a higher yield
than general obligations because of the limited resources backing them. Un-
rated general obligations should often have a higher yield than rated general
obligations because of the limited marketability of most of these bonds and
the fact that many poorer quality general obligations are not rated.
Rating agencies usually do not rate state and local issues (1) under a
certain size, (2) as a matter of policy, or (3) where information was inade-
quate.'6 In addition, the major rating agencies do not rate some state and
local issues that are in a weak credit position. There are some pressures for
the rating services not to rate general obligations which they would rate
below A. Some state and local units with weak credit positions appear to
purposely fail to give the rating agencies information required for a rating.
The issuing unit prefers no rating to a rating below A for fear of higher
interest costs resulting from a rating below A. Some investment bankers also
discourage ratings on issues they feel might receive a low rating. There is also
a possibility that state and local units with only a small amount of debt
14The decline in these yield differentials is probably also partially explained by an
increased demand for higher yielding state and local bonds by commercial banks under
competitive pressures because of the higher maximum rate on certificates of deposits.
15Figures are based on data from the Investment Bankers Association.
'6Both Moody's Investors Service (in Moody's Manual) and Standard and Poor's
Corporation (in Municipal Bond Selector) give these reasons for not rating some state
and local issues.Market Yield Relationships 141
CHART24
Monthly Median Yields on Unrated General Ob'igations and Baa
General Obligations, 1957-68
outstanding may be biased toward weaker credit position since they may have
inexperienced financial management and lack diversification with respect to
the resources used to support their indebtedness.
Chart 24 compares the monthly, median new issue reoffering yields on
unrated and Baa general obligations from 1957 through 1968. This chart
demonstrates that the median yield on unrated general obligations was close
to that on Baa general obligations in most of the 144 months covered. The
median yield on unrated general obligations exceeded the median yield on
1957'58'59'60 '61'62'63'64'65'66'67'68
Source:Unpublished data from the Investment Bankers Association.142 Postwar Quality of State and Local Debt
Baa general obligations in seventy-nine months, was less than the Baa median
yield in forty-eight months and was the same as the Baa median yield in
seventeen months. Examination of the reoffering yields on individual issues
used to compute the median yields revealed the average range of unrated
general obligations (approximately 110 basis points or 1.1 per cent) was
considerably wider than the average range of Baa general obligations (approxi-
mately 60 basis points) from 1957 through 1968. The cause of this wider
range was unrated issues which had yields substantially in excess of the medi-
an yields on Baa general obligations.17
Analysis of the neW issue reoffering yield information on unrated general
obligations provides two insights into the quality of unrated general obliga-
tions. First, if the new issue reoffering yields are indicative of the quality of
state and local debt, the quality of rated long-term general obligations is not
representative of the quality of all general obligations. Instead, the addition
of unrated general obligations tends to lower the average quality of all general
obligations. Median yield figures indicate that the average quality of unrated
general obligations was approximately the same as the quality of Baa general
obligations. Individual new issue reoffering yields also indicated that the qual-
ity of some unrated general obligations was considerably below the quality of
Baa general obligations with the highest yields.
Second, the median yields on unrated general obligations have tended to
exceed the median yields on Baa general obligations more often in the last
few years than in the late 1950's. This observation indicates that the new
issue reoffering yields on unrated general obligations have not followed the
narrowing trend relative to the yields on Aaa general obligations as much as
the yields on Baa and other rated general obligations. Thus, if new issue
reoffering yields are indicative of quality, the average quality of unrated
general obligations has remained more stable relative to the quality of Aaa
general obligations than other rated general obligations over the twelve years
covered in Chart 24.
Quality of Limited Liability Obligations
Chart 25 compares the yield differentials between A, Baa and unrated
limited liability obligations and similar general obligations from 1957 through
1968. The median new issue reoffering yields on the limited liability obliga-
tions exceeded the yields on the similarly rated general obligations in a nar-
row range of from 5-30 basis points in over three-fourths of the comparisons.
Over the twelve year period, the yields on A limited liability obligations
exceeded the yields on A general obligations by an average of 17 basis points.
The yields on Baa limited liability obligations exceeded the yields on Baa
'7The medians and langes of new issue reoffeiing yields were compiled by the NBER
staff from three sources: the Investment Bankers Association, Rand and Company and
The Weekly Bond Buyer.Market Yield Relationships 143
CHART25
Limited Liability Obligation Yields Minus General Obligation
Yields, 1957-68
general obligations by an average of 14 basis points, and the yields on unrated
limited liability obligations also exceeded the yields on unrated general obli-
gations by an average of 14 basis points.18
The yield data in Chart 25 indicate that the money and capital markets
have accepted fairly similar yields for limited liability obligations in similar
rating categories. The monthly median yield in each rating category has aver-
aged slightly higher for limited liability obligations than for general obliga-
tions. These yield relationships have remained remarkably stable over the
twelve year period except in the case of unrated limited liability obligations.
The median yield on unrated limited liability obligations exceeded the medi-
an yield on unrated general obligations by a monthly average of nearly 40
basis points in the late 1950's, but exceeded this general obligation median by
an average of less than 5 basis points in the mid-1960's. There has been a
trend, therefore, by the money and capital markets toward evaluating the
'8There were not enough Aaa or Aa rated limited liability obligations to have mean-
ingful monthly medians for the two categories. Individual Aaa or Aa limited liability
issues generally had median reoffering yields which were slightly (0-20 basis points)
above the similar Aaa or Aa general obligation median yields at the time of issue.
1957'58'59'60 '61'62'63'64'65'66'67'68
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quality of unrated limited liability obligations as roughly equal to that of
unrated general obligations. This observation seems particularly pertinent be-
cause between 40 and 50 per cent of the dollar amount and nearly three-
fourths of the number of limited liability obligations issued from 1957
through 1968 were not rated.19
These yields relationships indicate that the money and capital markets
evaluate the quality of limited liability obligations as being slightly below the
over-all quality of general obligations. The quality of limited liability obliga-
tions in each rating category is slightly below the quality of general obliga-
tions in the same category. The quality of unrated limited liability obligations
has improved to nearly equal to the quality of unrated general obligations.
Quality of Selected Special Classifications of State and Local Debt
Market yields offer one way to evaluate the quality of special classes of state
and local debt. For instance, the market yields of state and local debt issued
for a specific purpose or by a particular type of governmental unit can be
compared with a state and local yield average. This yield comparison should
indicate how the markets' evaluate the quality of the selected special class of
state and local debt relative to the quality of the state and local debt repre-
sented by the yield average.
There is very little information currently available on the market yields of
most classifications of state and local debt. Actual market yields are only
available for a limited number of actively traded "dollar" bonds, and new
issue reoffering yields have generally not been segregated into any special
class groupings. All of the available yield information on two special classes of
state and local debt in which quality has been questioned —thetoll road
bonds and the industrial aid bonds —isexamined in the following paragraphs.
The methods used should give some ideas about the procedures which can be
followed and the problems which may arise as more yield information for
special classifications of state and local debt becomes available.
Because of their competitive nature and limited liability, the quality of
toll road bonds has often been questioned. Chart 26 compares the offering
yields on toll road bonds issued from 1947 through 1955 with two yield
indexes for the same period. Toll road bond offering yields show no clear
pattern of conformity to the general market for state and local bonds; how-
ever, individual issues do appear to be influenced by this market. The offering
yields on many of the toll road issues were substantially above the two yield
indexes, indicating that the money and capital markets evaluated the quality
of many toll road issues as being substantially below the quality of the state
and local bonds represented by these two yield indexes.
19Based on figures obtained from the Investment Bankers Association.Market Yield Relationships 145
CHART 26
Offering Yields on Toll Road Bonds Compared with Yields on
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Market for State and Local Securities,
The market yield information on the second selected special class of state
and local debt, industrial aid bonds, is also limited. The twenty year new issue
reoffering yields are available for only 85 of the 987 state and local industrial
aid bonds reported to the Investment Bankers Association as issued between
1957 and 1968. The twenty year new issue reoffering yields on these indus-
trial aid bonds are compared with the monthly median new issue reoffering
yields on Baa general obligations from 1957 through 1968 in Chart 27. The
yields on eleven of the eighty-five industrial aid bonds were below the month-
ly median yield on Baa general obligations. The reoffering yields on thirty-six
of the eighty-five industrial aid bonds were from 0-50 basis points above the
monthly median yield on Baa general obligations, while the yields on thirty-
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CHART27
New Issue Reoffering Yields, 20 Year Maturity, for State and
Local Bonds Issued for Industrial Aid, 1957-68
median yield on Baa general obligations. The yield information in Chart 27,
therefore, indicates that the money and capital markets considered most
industrial aid bonds to be of lower quality than the Baa general obligations. It
also appears that the money and capital markets usually evaluated the quality
of industrial aid revenue bonds as being weaker than the quality of general
obligations issued for industrial aid.
Because of the limited size of this sample, all of the available net interest
cost for industrial aid bonds issued from 1957 through 1968, with average
Source: Unpublished data from the Investment Bankers Association.Market Yield Relationships 147
maturities of from ten to twenty years, are examined. The net interest cost
available for industrial aid bonds issued in these twelve years are:
Industrial Aid Bonds
Net Interest General Revenue Total
Cost Obligations Bonds All Bonds2°
3.01-3.50 57 3 60
3.51-4.00 117 41 158
4.01-4.50 40 58 98
4.51-5.00 18 50 68
5.01-5.50 5 50 55
5.51-6.00 7 60 67
6.01-6.50 2 13 15
Above6.50 0 4 4
246 279 525
Net interest costs are not directly comparable with yields. However, despite
some individual differences, the average net interest cost of the 85 industrial
aid bonds for which market yields are available was approximately equal to
the average of the net interest costs for the 525 bonds in the above tabula-
tion. The above net interest cost information would, then, seem to agree with
the earlier conclusions based on the limited number of available market
yields. The majority of industrial aid bonds issued from 1957 through 1968
appear to be of weaker quality than Baa general obligations, with the quality
of industrial aid revenue bonds evaluated as being weaker than the quality of
general obligations issued for industrial aid.
The money and capital markets' evaluation of the quality of the two
special classes of state and local debt discussed above is far from complete. As
more yield information for these and other special classifications of state and
local debt becomes available, market yields should become an important
method of evaluating the quality of selected special classes of state and local
debt.
Summary
To the extent that other factors affecting market yields can be eliminated,
market yield relationships indicate the money and capital markets' evaluation
of the quality of state and local debt. In this study, equal marketability is
assumed; comparisons are made between yields on bonds with similar maturi-
ty dates and special terms; and the direction of the effects of changes in
20Data obtained from the Investment Bankers Association.148 Postwar Quality of State and Local Debt
income tax rates, relative supplies and major institutional conditions are con-
sidered. There is no attempt, however, to measure the effect of these three
changes.
Subject to this limitation, the relationships between the yields on state
and local general obligations and the yields on U.S. government bonds (which
as a class are as free from credit risk as possible) indicated:
1. The only time since 1921 during which the quality of state and local
debt clearly showed a substantial change was from 193 1-34 when quality
deteriorated markedly.
2. From 1945 through 1961, when inferences on quality changes can be
drawn they are in the expected direction, i.e., premiums fall in business
expansions and rise in contractions. These changes occurred rapidly and were
short lived; therefore, they may have been caused by changes in factors other
than quality.
3. The quality of state and local debt remained constant or improved
slightly from 1961 through 1965. Any over-all improvement was a result of
an improvement in the quality of medium-grade rather than high-grade gene-
ral obligations. The degree of effect of the increased rates commercial banks
could pay on certificates of deposits is particularly difficult to ascertain in
this period. From 1966 through 1968 quality appears to have remained rela-
tively stable.
The relationship between yields in different rating categories and on dif-
ferent types and different classes of state and local debt indicates the money
and capital markets' evaluation of the quality of one rating category, type or
class relative to another. The primary other factor affecting these yield rela-
tionships is changes in institutional conditions. Because of the high correla-
tion between yields on Aaa general obligations and yields on federal bonds, a
reasonably accurate estimation of the money and capital markets' evaluation
of the absolute quality of a rating category, type or class of state and local
debt can be obtained through comparisons with the yields on Aaa general
obligations.21The relationship between the yields on different rating catego-
ries, different types, and different classes of state and local debt indicated:
1. The quality of rated general obligations was ranked in accordance with
the rating order —thequality of Aaa general obligations was the highest, with
bond quality becoming lower as the rating became lower.
2. The only sizeable potential change in the quality of Baa general obliga-
tions relative to Aaa general obligations during the postwar period occurred in
the 1961-65 period when the quality of Baa general obligations may have
improved slightly relative to the quality of Aaa general obligations. The de-
gree of 'the effect of the changes in the maximum rate banks that could pay
on certificates of deposits is difficult to determine.
21The relationship between yields on Aaa general obligations and federal bonds is
discussed in "The Postwar Quality of Municipal Bonds" by George H. Hempel, pp.
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3. The quality of Aa and A general obligations also may have improved
slightly relative to the quality of Aaa general obligations in the 1961.65
period. Once again, the degree of the effect of the change in the maximum
rate that banks could pay on certificates of deposits is difficult to determine.
4. The average quality of unrated general obligations was lower than the
average quality of rated general obligations. Furthermore, there were wide
dispersions in the quality of unrated general obligations; some issues were
high quality, while others were very low quality.
5. The average quality of unrated general obligations is close to that of
Baa general obligations. The quality of unrated general obligations appears to
have declined slightly relative to the quality of Baa general obligations from
1957 to 1968.
6. The over-all quality of limited liability obligations has been slightly
below the over-all quality of general obligations from 1957 through 1968
because: (1) the quality of limited liability obligations in each rating category
has been slightly below the quality of general obligations in the same rating
category; (2) the sizeable proportion of unrated limited liability obligations
with an average quality roughly equal to that of unrated general obligations in
recent years.
7. The quality of many toll road revenue bonds and many industrial aid
bonds is substantially below the quality of Baa general obligations. The qual-
ity of industrial aid revenue bonds is generally below the quality of general
obligations issued for industrial aid.150 Appendix Tables
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196825,033 2,062 6,59716,374 528 9,084 6,763
196723,313 1,780 6,24514,288 478 8,714 5,906
196617,612 1,740 4,78411,089 440 6,573 4,076
196517,622 1,865 4,67211,084 464 6,981 3,639
196415,967 1,892 3,53110,544 636 6,250 3,658
15,587 1,961 3,52010,107 254 5,815 4,037
196213,322 1,727 3,036 8,558 382 5,510 2,666
196112,874 1,469 3,044 8,360 189 5,573 2,598
196011,236 1,283 2,723 7,230 383 4,652 2,195
195911,860 1,563 2,616 7,681 310 4,850 2,521.
195811,359 1,675 2,235 7,449 182 5,543 1,724
195710,232 1,599 1,675 6,958 65 4,868 2,025
1956 8,153 1,222 1,484 5,446 199 3,577 1,670
1955 8,569 1,327 1,266 5,977 474 3,771 1,732
195410,319 1,897 1,453 6,969 374 3,381 3,214
1953 8,315 1,679 1,078 5,558 496 3,495 1,567
1952 6,450 955 1,0944,401 304 2,634 1,463
1951 4,915 540 1,097 3,278 328 2,220 730
1950 5,305 544 1,067 3,694 59 3,035 600
1949 4,328 370 963 2,995 143 2,169 683
1948 3,994 307 698 2,990 66 2,374 550
1947 3,311 250 708 2,354 4 1,964 386
1946 1,944 252 489 1,204 19 980 205
1945 1,484 225 440 819 3 613 203
1944 1,281 252 317 712 13 457 242
1943 1,219 239 472 508 61 291 156
1942 1,689 425 688 576 89 390 97
1941 2,637 392 1,016 1,229 22 1,099 108
1940 3,124 495 1,131 1,498 22 1,288 188
1939 2,307 51 1,157 1,099 0 981 118
1938 2,397 0 1,168 1,229 0 1,078 151
1937 1,696 0 712 984 0 832 152
1936 1,889 0 733 1,156 0 1,039 117
1935 2,183 0 988 1,196 0 1,080 116
1934 2,108 0 933 1,175 0 1,159 16
1933 2,116 0 988 1,128 0 1,128 n
1932 2,029 0 1,092 937 0 937 11
1931 2,339 0 1,087 1,252 0 1,166 86
1930 2,335 0 952 1,383 0 1,369 14
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1.929 2,363 0 921 1,442 0 1,399 43
1928 2,107 0 717 1,390 0 1,370 20
1927 2,103 0 625 1,478 0 1,465 13
1926 2,023 0 661 1,362 0 1,317 45
1925 2,271 0 8661,405 0 1,392 13
1924 2,426 0 979 1,447 0 1,440 7
1923 1,649 0 5141,135 0 1,134 1
1922 1,675 0 3961,280 0 1,277 3
1921 2,145 0 762 1,383 0 1,376 7
1920 1,438 0 664 774 0 773 1
1919 1,220 0 450 770 0 753 17
1918 736 0 473 263 0 263 11
1917 837 0 392 445 0 444 1
1916 790 0 292 497 0 495 2
1915 647 0 155 493 0 292 1
1914 732 0 286 446 0 446 n
1913 892 0 483 408 0 408 n
1912 591 0 192 399 0 399 Ii
1911 643 0 191 452 0 451 1
1910 522 0 197 324 0 324 n
1909 482 0 118 364 0 364 n
1908 530 0 175 355 0 355 n
1907 469 0 167 301 0 301 n
1906 426 0 125 301 0 301 n
1905 348 0 150 198 0 198 n
1904 417 0 131 287 0 287 n
Sources.Public housing debt figures obtained from the Public Housing Administra-
tion.Revenue bonds issued from 1904 through 1937 compiled by NBER staff from files
at The Bond Buyer, Inc. and John F. Fowler, Bonds, New York, 1938. Other
figures obtained from The Bond Buyer's Municipal Finance Statistics, Vol. IV, New York,
1969.
aGeneral obligations inthis appendix are total long-term debt less public housing
bonds and revenue bond, and include nonguaranteed special assessment bonds, which
are limited liability obligations.
n =Amountissued less than $500,000.152 Appendix Tables
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1968a121,158 1,1177,310112,7315,297 59,781 47,653
1967a114,614 9766,017107,6214,845 57,917 44,859
1966a107,051 979 5,072101,0004,537 55,263 41,200
1965a 99,512 9114,39894,2044,224 52,194 37,786
1964a 92,222 1,001 3,69487,5273,804 49,462 34,261
1963 87,451 980 3,32083,1513,533 47,172 32,446
1962 81,278 977 2,75877,5433,270 45,051 29,222
1961 75,023 846 2,63771,5403,016 41,646 26,878
1960 69,955 731 2,42366,8012,872 38,778 25,151
1959 64,110 853 2,13061,1272,566 36,697 21,864
1958 58,187 816 1,63555,7372,383 33,461 19,893
1957 53,039 688 1,50650,8452,296 30,714 17,835
1956 48,868 720 1,37346,7752,181 29,634 14,960
1955 44,267 963 1,03242,2721,864 27,461 12,947
1954 38,931 1,203 83036,8981,407 25,586 9,905
1953 33,782 1,037 74132,0041,270 23,003 7,731
1952 30,100 849 53128,720 857 21,579 6,284
1951 27,040 549 94225,549 409 20,943 4,197
1950 24,115 239 82123,056 414 19,378 3,264
1949 20,999 220 51420,265 418 17,369 2,478
1948 18,656 223 36018,073 414 15,739 1,920
1947 16,815 233 13616,446 419 14,143 1,884
1946 15,917 232 2315,662 423 13,241 1,998
1945 16,671 232 12716,312 427 13,794 2,091
1944 17,479. 244 38116,854 434 14,238 2,182
1943 18,773 245 47518,053 435 15,162 2,456
1942 19,337 299 63218,406 338 15,482 2,586
1941 19,907 336 79218,779 203 15,905 2,671
1940 20,283 287 94819,048 33 16,347 2,668
1937 19,462 0 87518,587 0 15,887 2,700
1932 19,205 0 1,33117,874 0 15,869 2,005
1927 14,881 0 54514,336 0
1922 10,109 0 6549,455 0 8,661 794
1913 4,414 0 2204,194 0
1902 2,107 0 100 2,007 0 2007cAppendix Tables 153
Notes to Appendix Table 2
Note: Census data for excluded years priorto 1940 are not consistent with definition
and data in this study.
Sources:Figures obtained from records of the Governments Division of U.S. Bureau
of the Census and the Public Housing Administration.
aAll data based on June 30 fiscal years starting in 1964.Prior to 1964 some local
governments reported on different fiscal year bases. Total state and local debt outstand-
ing was $85,056 in 1963 using the June 30 fiscal year basis for all local governments.
bLimited liability obligationswere slightly understated and other general obligations
overstated from 1948 to 1951 because some nonguaranteed special assessment bonds were
(incorrectly) classified as general obligations.Prior to 1948 limited liability obligations
were the total of revenue bonds and nonguaranteed special assessment bonds.
CLimited liability obligations were not separated from other long-term debt in 1927,
1913 and1902.154 Appendix Tables
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Dollar Amount of Long-Term State and Local Debt Outstanding, by Type of










1968a33,62279,1098,462 33,942 1,973 18,01616,716
1967a31,18576,4367,685 32,186 1,950 18,00616,611
1966a28,50472,4976,841 30,892 1,723 17,368 15,664
26,23567,9696,367 29,280 1,707 16,29014,325
1964a24,40163,1265,818 27,773 1,651 15,257 12,627
196322,75160,3995,623 26,913 1,556 14,363 11,945
196221,56155,9825,247 24,866 1,315 13,767 10,787
196119,530 52,0124,791 23,566 1,080 12,696 9,878
196018,128 48,6734,900 21,900 1,035 11,800 9,000
195916,42144,7064,600 20,900 949 11,300 7,000
195815,06540,6724,100 19,400 1,000 10,000 6,200
195713,52237,0133,502 17,941 1,059 8,995 5,517
195612,64334,4243,343 16,140 9S6 8,394 5,593
195510,95131,3222,960 15,302 833 7,098 5,128
19549,31727,5812,624 13,893 782 5,827 4,454
19537,50524,4992,370 12,912 647 4,551 4,018
19526,64022,0811,937 12,113 604 3,715 3,710
19516,10119,4471,795 11,285 368 3,130 2,870
19505,25417,8871,629 10,577 308 2,590 2,784
19494,01416,1261,535 9,223 268 2,044 3,055
19483,71614,3571,370 8,641 247 1,477 2,621
1947 2,89413,5521,442 7,914 166 1,294 2,736
19462,33313,3341,381 7,981 155 1,220 2,597
19452,42213,8901,410 8,270 170 1,273 2,667
19442,76014,0861,659 8,407 191 1,380 2,449
19432,85614,9161,580 9,067 254 1,495 2,520
19423,06715,6571,776 9,485 250 1,626 2,520
19413,17115,8411,943 9,555 260 1,669 2,414
19403,28016,0572,036 9,511 280 1,699 2,531
19373,07315,3932,238 9,175 310 1,724 1,946
19322,50215,3172,548 9,157 343 1,987 1,282
19221,1068,4741,282 5,477 101 985 627
1913 4234,075 393 3,447 80 119 36
1902 2701,924 205 1,612 56 46 5
Note: Census data for excluded years prior to 1940 are not consistent with definition
and data in this study.
Source:Figures obtained from records of the Governments Division of U.S. Bureau of
the Census.
aAll data basedon June 30 fiscal years starting in 1964.Prior to 1964 some local
governments reported on different fiscal year bases.
bTheclassification special districts (other than school districts) includes some local
statutory authorities.State statutory authorities and the remaining local statutory auth-
orities are included as nonguaranteed debt of the issuing governmental unit. A further
breakdown of these figures is not available at the present time.A
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